(last updated: 2019-08-20 @ 14:00 EST / 2019-08-20 @ 16:00 UTC )
First, let me say how much I love some of the new functionality in SQL Server 2019:
- Using In-Memory tables for
- Adaptive inlining of T-SQL scalar functions
- Optimizing indexes for sequential inserts (i.e. IDENTITY)
- Better table variable statistics
- and quite a few others…
However, nobody’s perfect and occasionally the SQL Server team makes a mistake. A new feature introduced in SQL Server 2019 CTP 3.2, “Feature Restrictions”, is an unfortunate example of such a mistake. It’s a tragically misguided attempt at improving security that not only increases the chances of SQL Injection, but it also prevented useful changes from being made. “Misguided” because it doesn’t even accomplish it’s stated goal, and “tragic” because it a) most likely increases the chances of SQL Injection, and b) used up the time that could have been spent on implementing useful changes.
What is “Feature Restrictions”?
Feature Restrictions accepts that Dynamic SQL exists and that code exists in your system that concatenates unchecked (or inadequately checked) user input into the query to be executed (as opposed to using parameters and/or thorough validations). The idea of this feature is to disable certain features used by hackers to gain knowledge of the system.
Ideally, application code is developed so it does not allow for SQL injection. However, in large code-bases that include legacy and external code, one can never be sure that all cases have been addressed, so SQL injections are a fact of life that we have to protect against.
The current two features available to restrict are: “ErrorMessages”, and “WaitFor”. Restricting “ErrorMessages” will mask system details in the error messages (e.g. table names, datatypes, etc), and “WaitFor” will simply disable the
WAITFOR statement from causing any amount of waiting.
Unfortunately, the new “Feature Restrictions” feature is not going to protect any database against SQL Injection. Not only is “Feature Restrictions” absolutely worthless in that it doesn’t even do what it claims to do, but because it does not truly protect against these types of SQL Injection attacks, it gives a false sense of security to those who only read the official documentation and implement this feature thinking that they are then secure. That makes this feature actually quite dangerous, and the end result could actually be an increase in SQL Injection attacks.
The feature is meant to protect against SQL Injection, which can only happen in ad hoc query batches (i.e. Dynamic SQL), yet disabled features are disabled even in compiled contexts, such as stored procedures, where this is no chance of SQL Injection.I had originally thought that this was a problem, but then I got the following to work, so perhaps it cannot simply be ad hoc batches:
SELECT * FROM sys.objects WHERE [is_ms_shipped] = 0; EXEC(N'CREATE PROCEDURE #Temp AS SELECT DB_NAME(); WAITFOR DELAY ''00:00:05'';'); EXEC(N'EXEC #Temp;');
- While it is likely that this feature is enabled in Production only, sometimes it is hard to reproduce errors based on user descriptions of what happened, and so that error message might be quite useful to QA and/or support.
- The “error messages” with masked internal information are only system generated error message. The output of
THROWis not masked! (example below)
Hiding error messages helps for scenarios where the error message is displayed, but isn’t it more common for the application to simply indicate that an error happened without showing any details? Either using a customer error page or even just a standard “500 Internal Server Error” page? In these scenarios, an attacker can infer from differences in behavior, between error and no error cases. And you cannot prevent all errors entirely (well, you could, I suppose, but that would be quite dangerous and foolish). Hence, the following cannot be prevented by this feature:
IF (USER = 'dbo') SELECT 1 / 0;
IF (USER = 'dbo') SELECT * FROM dbo.[NoSuchTable];
WAITFORis not the only means of causing a delay. It is possible to inject a simple loop that ends after a specified number of seconds, and does not cause any error. For example:
IF (USER = 'dbo') BEGIN DECLARE @Now DATETIME = DATEADD(SECOND, 5, GETDATE()); WHILE (GETDATE() < @Now) DECLARE @Dummy INT; END;
EXEUTE AS 'dbo', or Login is member of
sysadminFixed Server Role, or
EXECUTE ASUser associated with Login that is "sysadmin" and DB is
TRUSTWORTHY ONand DB owned by Login that has a certain level of permissions, will prevent restriction:
WITH EXEUTE AS 'dbo'clause is often used when creating a stored procedure or function to grant rights to perform operations such as
TRUNCATE TABLE. It is also sometimes used to get Dynamic SQL working since Dynamic SQL breaks ownership chaining, and we don't want to give direct table DML access to the application account. And, just to be clear, this does not require that
TRUSTWORTHYbe set to
ON, or even that the "dbo" User be associated with a Login that is a "sysadmin". (examples below)
- Hopefully the application account isn't logging in as "sa" or anyone in the "sysadmin" fixed server role. But this does happen, and feature restrictions do not apply to any Login that is a member of the "sysadmin" fixed server role. This is important to note because the example given for the
WaitForrestriction (in the documentation) is:
IF (SYSTEM_USER = 'sa') WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:05' ...
There are two significant problems with this example:
- "sa" is likely not the only account with "sysadmin" privileges. Anyone looking will be checking the following:
SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER(N'sysadmin', SYSTEM_USER)
- Any Login in the "sysadmin" role will not have either of these features restricted. Hence, if this condition is actually true, then the
WAITFORwill behave normally, and will indicate that the current security context has "sysadmin" privileges.
- "sa" is likely not the only account with "sysadmin" privileges. Anyone looking will be checking the following:
- Similar to item # 1, sometimes the
EXECUTE ASclause is used to grant Instance/Server -level permissions such as
VIEW SERVER STATE. In this case, the User specified is associated with Login that is "sysadmin" and the Database is set to
TRUSTWORTHY ONand the Database is owned by a Login that has a certain level of permissions (not sure yet what the minimum required level is, but being in the
sysadminFixed Server Role certainly works). No features are restricted in modules using this setup. (no example yet, but will add one soon).
These are all even more reasons to use Module Signing instead of
There is a bug with the
WaitForrestriction: security context gets cached the first time a query is executed that checks the current user. But, whatever is cached can be dropped automatically by the system (probably for a variety of reasons), or manually by executing:
DBCC FREESYSTEMCACHE('ALL', 'default');
I also tested with
DBCC FREESYSTEMCACHE('ALL', 'internal');and that had no effect.
This is a minor bug because the scenarios that would be using this feature would almost certainly already have a query being executed before the
WAITFORis introduced. Still, a good security feature wouldn't rely so much on luck. (example below)
There is a bug in the permissions checking on the
sys.sql_feature_restrictionssystem catalog view. According to the documentation:
However, as far as I can tell, there are no restrictions at all for selecting from this system catalog view. (example below)
- Database is owned by a low-privileged Login.
OFF(the default setting).
IF (SUSER_ID(N'_TestDbOwner') IS NULL) BEGIN CREATE LOGIN [_TestDbOwner] WITH PASSWORD = 'NotVerySecure', CHECK_POLICY = OFF; END; IF (DB_ID(N'FeatureRestrictionTest') IS NULL) BEGIN CREATE DATABASE [FeatureRestrictionTest] COLLATE Latin1_General_100_BIN2_UTF8; ALTER DATABASE [FeatureRestrictionTest] SET RECOVERY SIMPLE; ALTER AUTHORIZATION ON DATABASE::[FeatureRestrictionTest] TO [_TestDbOwner]; END; GO USE [FeatureRestrictionTest]; CREATE LOGIN [_TestAppAccount] WITH PASSWORD = 'NotVerySecure', CHECK_POLICY = OFF; CREATE USER [_TestAppAccount] FOR LOGIN [_TestAppAccount]; GO CREATE OR ALTER PROCEDURE dbo.[ShowSecurityContext] AS SET NOCOUNT ON; SELECT SYSTEM_USER AS [Login], [name], [type], [usage] FROM sys.login_token; SELECT USER AS [User], [name], [type], [usage] FROM sys.user_token; GO GRANT EXECUTE ON dbo.[ShowSecurityContext] TO [public];
Please note that the capitalization of “waitfoR” and “useR” is intentional: I am testing in a DB using a binary collation to make sure that everything behaves as expected.
EXEC sp_add_feature_restriction N'waitfoR', N'useR', N'_TestAppAccount'; EXEC sp_add_feature_restriction N'ErrormessageS', N'useR', N'_TestAppAccount'; SELECT * FROM sys.sql_feature_restrictions; /* class object feature User _TestAppAccount WaitFor User _TestAppAccount ErrorMessages */
Test: “ErrorMessages” —
THROW aren’t blocked
EXECUTE AS LOGIN = N'_TestAppAccount'; EXEC dbo.[ShowSecurityContext]; SELECT * FROM sys.objects WHERE [is_ms_shipped] = 0 AND CAST(DB_NAME() AS INT) = 0; /* Msg 245, Level 16, State 1, Line XXXXX Conversion failed when converting the ****** value '******' to data type ******. */ SELECT * FROM sys.objects WHERE [is_ms_shipped] = 0; DECLARE @Stuff NVARCHAR(4000) = DB_NAME() + NCHAR(42) + ORIGINAL_LOGIN(); RAISERROR(@Stuff, 16, 1); /* (2 rows affected) Msg 50000, Level 16, State 1, Line XXXXX FeatureRestrictionTest*ALBRIGHT\Solomon */ SELECT * FROM sys.objects WHERE [is_ms_shipped] = 0; DECLARE @XML NVARCHAR(4000) = (SELECT [name], [type], [usage] FROM sys.user_token FOR XML RAW('r')); RAISERROR(@XML, 16, 1); /* (2 rows affected) Msg 50000, Level 16, State 1, Line XXXXX <r name="_TestAppAccount" type="SQL USER" usage="GRANT OR DENY"/><r name="public" type="ROLE" usage="GRANT OR DENY"/> */ DECLARE @Err NVARCHAR(4000) = DB_NAME(); ;THROW 50505, @Err, 16; /* Msg 50505, Level 16, State 16, Line XXXXX FeatureRestrictionTest */ REVERT; EXEC dbo.[ShowSecurityContext];
Test: “ErrorMessages” — EXECUTE AS ‘dbo’ prevents restriction
Create Stored Procedures
GO CREATE OR ALTER PROCEDURE dbo.[ErrorMessages] AS SET NOCOUNT ON; EXEC dbo.[ShowSecurityContext]; SELECT [name] FROM sys.objects WHERE [is_ms_shipped] = 0 AND CAST(DB_NAME() AS INT) = 0; GO CREATE OR ALTER PROCEDURE dbo.[ErrorMessages_ExecAsDBO] WITH EXECUTE AS N'dbo' AS SET NOCOUNT ON; EXEC dbo.[ShowSecurityContext]; SELECT [name] FROM sys.objects WHERE [is_ms_shipped] = 0 AND CAST(DB_NAME() AS INT) = 0; GO GRANT EXECUTE ON dbo.[ErrorMessages] TO [_TestAppAccount]; GRANT EXECUTE ON dbo.[ErrorMessages_ExecAsDBO] TO [_TestAppAccount];
Execute Stored Procedures
EXECUTE AS LOGIN = N'_TestAppAccount'; EXEC dbo.[ShowSecurityContext]; EXEC dbo.[ErrorMessages]; -- masked EXEC dbo.[ErrorMessages_ExecAsDBO]; -- not masked REVERT; EXEC dbo.[ShowSecurityContext];
Test: “WaitFor” — Simple
WHILE loop to force a delay
IF (1 = 1) BEGIN DECLARE @Now DATETIME = DATEADD(SECOND, 5, GETDATE()); WHILE (GETDATE() < @Now) BEGIN DECLARE @Dummy INT; END; END;
Test: “WaitFor” — EXECUTE AS ‘dbo’ prevents restriction
Create Stored Procedures
GO CREATE OR ALTER PROCEDURE dbo.[WaitFor] AS SET NOCOUNT ON; EXEC dbo.[ShowSecurityContext]; WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:03.000'; -- 3 seconds GO CREATE OR ALTER PROCEDURE dbo.[WaitFor_ExecAsDBO] WITH EXECUTE AS N'dbo' AS SET NOCOUNT ON; EXEC dbo.[ShowSecurityContext]; WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:03.000'; -- 3 seconds GO GRANT EXECUTE ON dbo.[WaitFor] TO [_TestAppAccount]; GRANT EXECUTE ON dbo.[WaitFor_ExecAsDBO] TO [_TestAppAccount];
Execute Stored Procedures
EXECUTE AS LOGIN = N'_TestAppAccount'; EXEC dbo.[ShowSecurityContext]; EXEC dbo.[WaitFor]; -- no delay EXEC dbo.[WaitFor_ExecAsDBO]; -- 3-second delay REVERT; EXEC dbo.[ShowSecurityContext];
Test: “WaitFor” — Bug allows
WAITFOR to cause delay again
EXECUTE AS LOGIN = N'_TestAppAccount'; EXEC dbo.[ShowSecurityContext]; -- Execute the following in another Query tab: -- USE [master]; DBCC FREESYSTEMCACHE('ALL', 'default') WITH NO_INFOMSGS; WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:03'; -- 3-second delay (NOT expected) SELECT TOP (1) [name] FROM sys.objects; WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:03'; -- no delay (expected) -- If the above command did cause a delay, re-run -- the "SELECT TOP (1)" just above it and then -- re-execute this WAITFOR. -- Execute the following in another Query tab: -- USE [master]; DBCC FREESYSTEMCACHE('ALL', 'default') WITH NO_INFOMSGS; WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:03'; -- 3-second delay again (NOT expected) REVERT; EXEC dbo.[ShowSecurityContext];
Test: “sys.sql_feature_restrictions” — No permissions required to
This test uses a Database-only User. This type of User cannot have any Instance/Server -level permissions because they do not have an SID that matches any SID in
sys.server_principals. And, no Database-level permissions (including
CONTROL) are granted.
CREATE USER [Mr.NoLogin] WITHOUT LOGIN; EXECUTE AS USER = 'Mr.NoLogin'; EXEC dbo.[ShowSecurityContext]; SELECT * FROM sys.dm_db_fts_index_physical_stats; /* Msg 262, Level 14, State 1, Line XXXXX VIEW DATABASE STATE permission denied in database 'FeatureRestrictionTest'. Msg 297, Level 16, State 1, Line XXXXX The user does not have permission to perform this action. */ SELECT * FROM sys.sql_feature_restrictions; /* class object feature User _TestAppAccount WaitFor User _TestAppAccount ErrorMessages */ REVERT; EXEC dbo.[ShowSecurityContext];
Clean-up / Tear-down
USE [master]; DROP DATABASE [FeatureRestrictionTest]; DROP LOGIN [_TestAppAccount]; DROP LOGIN [_TestDbOwner];
Fun Facts That Are Not Officially Documented Yet
Here are some behaviors I found in testing that are not yet in the documentation:
sp_drop_feature_restrictionis not yet in IntelliSense.
- “Feature Restrictions” cannot be used in three system databases:
USE [master]; EXEC sp_add_feature_restriction N'ErrorMessages', N'User', N'MyUser'; USE [tempdb]; EXEC sp_add_feature_restriction N'ErrorMessages', N'User', N'MyUser'; USE [model]; EXEC sp_add_feature_restriction N'ErrorMessages', N'User', N'MyUser'; /* Msg 16305, Level 16, State 0, Procedure sp_add_feature_restriction, Line XXXXX [Batch Start Line YYYYY] The database does not support feature restrictions. */
“Feature Restrictions” can be used in one system database:
USE [msdb]; EXEC sp_add_feature_restriction N'ErrorMessages', N'User', N'MyUser'; /* Msg 16301, Level 16, State 0, Procedure sp_add_feature_restriction, Line XXXXX [Batch Start Line YYYYY] User 'MyUser' not found. */
Cannot add “dbo” User to “Feature Restrictions”:
EXEC sp_add_feature_restriction N'waitfoR', N'useR', N'dbo'; /* Msg 16309, Level 16, State 0, Procedure sp_add_feature_restriction, Line XXXXX [Batch Start Line YYYYY] Feature restrictions are not allowed for the dbo user. */
- Restrictions do not apply to either of the following scenarios:
- module is created using
WITH EXECUTE AS 'dbo'clause —
- Login is member of
sysadminFixed Server Role —
- module is created using
- “ErrorMessages” option does not mask custom error messages sent from:
Can This Feature Be Fixed?
- You can’t prevent all error output entirely (i.e. the entire message returned by
THROW) as that would make debugging extremely difficult, if not impossible.
- You can’t prevent forcing an error, either a simple “divide by zero”, or selecting from an object that doesn’t exist. Even if error messages are not shown to the end user (this is usually the case, right?), isn’t there at least some indication of there at least being an error (again, this is usually the case, right?)?
- You can’t prevent
- Hackers are more clever than this feature gives them credit for. If I was able to find all of these holes in this feature, you better believe hackers will find even more.
Clearly this feature was neither planned out well nor thoroughly tested.
This feature is intended to improve security when using Dynamic SQL. When using Dynamic SQL, it is common to run into permissions problems resulting from broken Ownership Chaining. While it is best to use Module Signing in order to resolve the permissions errors, many people still use the
WITH EXECUTE AS clause with either
OWNER as the User to “Execute As” (and if the Schema is owned by
dbo, then that is the same as specifying
'dbo'). If “Feature Restrictions” does not work with the
dbo User, and yet it is common for stored procedures using Dynamic SQL to be executing as
dbo, then how often will “Feature Restrictions” actually be restricting anything?
If anything is to be restricted, why not expand the existing permissions hierarchy by making more commands their own named permissions, commands such as
REVOKE system that people are familiar with and would allow for
DENYing something such as
WAITFOR, which can be a Database-level permission (along with
TRUNCATE TABLE can be Schema-level and/or object-level).
If the desire is to make Dynamic SQL more secure without requiring code changes (or at least a lot of them), then a far better approach would be to attempt preventing end-user manipulation of the query, rather than what the query can do once it has been manipulated. There are only a few methods that someone can use to inject their own SQL, but if they can do even one of them, then there is a lot that they can do. Rather than focus on cleaning up a mess, focus on preventing the mess (i.e. “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure”). If the problems all begin with User input, provide one or more mechanisms to filter one or more input parameters. For example, implementing the following suggestion would not only work for this scenario, but it also handles other scenarios, thereby increasing the ROI for the time / energy put into developing it: “Intercept query batch from client to rewrite it or cancel it“.
Regardless, from my perspective, “Feature Restrictions” is a wasted opportunity in that I am guessing at least 50 – 100 developer hours were spent on adding this feature, between planning, development, testing, etc. Unfortunately, all of that time was wasted delivering a feature that will never do anything. And by “wasted” I mean that those hours could have been spent delivering real value to the SQL Server community. In that same amount of time, both of the following updates could have been made which would have benefited many thousands of users:
- Allow Asymmetric Key to be created from binary hex bytes string just like CREATE CERTIFICATE — this is merely a request to get the public key bytes from a
VARBINARYliteral string (or variable) instead of from a file or Assembly. There is nothing different to interpret as the bytes read from the
0x...string or variable is identical to whatever is in the file or Assembly (except that executable files and assemblies have extra bytes of program code to skip over, but the internal logic is all the same). No private key handling is necessary; we just need the Asymmetric Key created from the public key only.
- Allow SQLCLR to Connect to LocalDB instance using “(LocalDB)\InstanceName” connection string in EXTERNAL_ACCESS instead of requiring UNSAFE — this is just a few minutes of work to add a single line of code to what eventually gets compiled as the sqlaccess.dll assembly:
That’s it! Just copy and paste that in and change “appDomain” to whatever it should be.
I do not want to be harsh as, again, I do love SQL Server and it has many more positive and great features than failings. But, this is still quite frustrating knowing that development time required to implement one or more very needed and definitely beneficial features was available but squandered, leaving us with nothing (or worse: a mess of a feature that will only serve to confuse and/or give the false sense of having security) when we could have easily had something.
This feature needs to be removed before people start using it and get a false sense of security, thinking that they are being protected against certain forms of SQL Injection.
sp_add_feature_restriction(no documentation page yet)
sp_drop_feature_restriction(no documentation page yet)
I filed a bug report to have this feature removed:
Found two more problems:
EXECUTE ASUser associated with Login that is “sysadmin” and DB is
TRUSTWORTHY ONand DB owned by Login that has a certain level of permissions, prevents restrictions.
- No permissions required to
sys.sql_feature_restrictionssystem catalog view.
Both of these issues have been integrated into the post.